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### 1nc 1

**Secondary legislation for Mexican energy reform will pass**

**Borda and Traurig 4/7** (Interview: Nicolas Borda, partner, Greenberg Traurig (GT), Mexico 07.04.2014 nkj)

Given the transformations sweeping the Mexican energy industry, where is Greenberg Traurig (GT) focusing its efforts at this point in time?

The year of 2014 will be more about strategic analyses of the reforms and understanding the new changes and legal frameworks they introduce. This will enable us to explain to our clients the new regulatory and legal environment in Mexico, which in turn will endow them with the ever-critical first mover’s advantage.

We expect to have the secondary legislation approved by late April, or late May, should there be an extraordinary period in Congress. That is, the opposition party in Congress is looking to enact secondary legislation in other areas including telecommunications, antitrust and politics before the energy reforms. Hence, although the deadline for energy reforms has been set for the 21st of April, we could see a slight delay there. Subsequently, we will have the regulations issued by the executive branch sometime in the last quarter of this year. As such, 2014 will be a year dedicated to completing and understanding the new legal framework and studying the first mover advantages in different niches within the Mexican market.

#### Plan destroys nieto’sagenda

Hennessey & Wilkinson, 13 (5/1/2013, Kathleen Hennessey and Tracy Wilkinson, “Obama, Mexico leader to avoid hot topics, at least publicly; The U.S. president is interested in a plan to open Mexico's energy industry and Enrique Peña Nieto is watching the immigration debate up north, but both want to avoid the appearance of interference,” <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/01/world/la-fg-obama-mexico-20130502>, JMP)

WASHINGTON — President Obama will seek to cement relations with Mexico's new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, over the next two days with vows of neighborly kinship and future cooperation. But the true test of their ability to work together may be whether they can hold their tongues.

Obama's visit to Mexico City comes as the fight over border security and immigration reform has begun to consume Congress. Peña Nieto supports the effort but wants to avoid the mistakes of a predecessor, Vicente Fox, who lobbied for a 2001 immigration reform bill in Congress. Conservatives charged that Fox was meddling in U.S. affairs.

Obama will try to avoid the same charge. The White House is monitoring Peña Nieto's calls to reform Mexico's vast energy industry. U.S. companies could benefit if it opens oil and gas exploration to foreign investors. But a public endorsement by Obama, or even a perception of one, could undermine the already fraught endeavor.

"Mexicans have an understanding of noninterference. So they do not want us to talk about energy, and they will not talk about immigration," said Diana Negroponte, a senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution. "It's a quid pro quo."

If those issues are raised at length publicly, she said, it may signal a "degree of irritation" in private talks.

The two leaders are likely to discuss their priorities and try to exert influence at a meeting and a dinner, both closed to journalists. Mexicans are concerned about the temporary work permits in the Senate bill on immigration, a detail that affects the flow of workers back and forth across the border.

Obama's aides have billed his visit as a chance to shift the U.S. perception of Latin America from drug wars and illegal border crossings to a region on the rise. This argument leans heavily on the success of Peña Nieto's reform agenda, which includes changes in education, telecommunications, banking and energy.

"What I'd say broadly is that energy is an area of great promise and cooperation across the Americas," Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor, said Wednesday.

Still, White House officials say they've put the word out that cooperation by Mexico is welcome, but commentary less so, especially on immigration. "We've emphasized on our side that this is a domestic political issue, primarily," said Ricardo Zuniga, senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs on the National Security Council.

"I think Peña Nieto has to be very careful," said Carl Meacham, a director of the Americas Program at the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies. "There are elements here who would view what he says as being partial to one side or the other. That is not helpful."

#### Reform key to US and Mexico economies, competitiveness and energy independence

Garcia, 11/4 --- graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs in the Security Policy Studies program (Alejandro, 11/4/2013, International Affairs Review, “Mexico's Energy Reform: Opportunities for the United States,” <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/516>, JMP)

Economic Opportunities

Mexico is the United States’ largest trading partner, so economic growth in Mexico is of great importance to the United States. Because the oil industry accounts for a significant portion of government revenues, PEMEX's economic competitiveness (or lack thereof) directly impacts Mexico’s overall economic development. A liberalized oil sector would likely lead to more jobs and added competitiveness on the international market. The country's economy is expected to grow just two to three percent this year, and some economists believe the best case scenario for increased oil production capacity would add between one and two percentage points to potential growth. The United States would also benefit as major oil companies such as Exxon and Chevron may begin to invest in Mexico’s oil sector. Since a central U.S. foreign policy priority for the Western Hemisphere is to support trade and sustainable economic development, the United States should endorse Mexican energy reform.

Energy Security

A reform agenda that boosts oil production in Mexico would be beneficial to the United States' energy security. Countries enhance their energy security – the affordability and reliability of supply – when they are able to diversify their supply sources and decrease their dependence on any one energy type or source. Oil is a particularly critical source of energy in the United States as it currently meets nearly 40 percent of U.S. energy needs, totaling 94 percent of energy use in the transportation sector. Terrorism, political instability, geopolitical rivalries, nationalist sentiments, and rapidly growing demand by emerging economies can disrupt the United States’ oil supply and threaten its ability to meet its energy needs. As of 2011, about 40 percent of crude oil and petroleum products came from members of the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Larger energy exports from Mexico to the United States would decrease dependency on OPEC and unstable regions of the Middle East. Mexico is already one of the United States’ most important suppliers of oil, but it will have difficulty meeting demand (domestically and in the United States) if PEMEX is unable to boost its upstream oil production. Natural gas production within the United States has been a major enabler of greater energy independence, but diversification – having the ability to import from various nations and having alternative energy sources – is key to enhanced energy security.

North American Energy Alliance

There is potential for the Western Hemisphere to be a stable and reliable energy supplier, and PEMEX reform could provide the stimulus needed for a North American Energy Alliance. Latin America possesses the second largest oil reserves outside the Middle East. Governments should aim to deepen economic ties and strengthen competitiveness to ensure North American companies are positioned to succeed in an increasingly competitive global market. Expanding offshore oil production would strengthen the energy trading relationship between Mexico and the United States. Critics emphasize expanding offshore drilling would slow investment in clean energy projects and contradict efforts at combatting the negative environmental effects of climate change, but a practical path to a sustainable energy future requires supporting domestic or regional supply additions for both oil and natural gas. A free-trade zone for energy that encourages private sector engagement would strengthen economies, reduce the United States' oil dependence from unstable regions, and provide an institutional framework for building a more reliable energy infrastructure.

#### Oil dependence makes aggressive warfare inevitable – reduction of dependency encourages cooperation rather than warfare

COLLINA, 5 (Tom Z. Collina, Executive Director, 20/20 Vision, “Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Real Dangers, Realistic Solutions,” Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs United States Senate, October 19, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005\_hr/051020-collina.pdf)

Bottom line: our economy and security are increasingly dependent on one of the most unstable regions on earth. Unless we change our ways, we will find ourselves even more at the mercy of Middle East oil and thus more likely to get involved in future conflicts. The greater our dependence on oil, the greater the pressure to protect and control that oil. The growing American **dependence** on imported oil **is the primary driver of U.S. foreign and military policy today,** particularly in the Middle East, **and motivates an aggressive military policy** now on display in Iraq. To help avoid similar wars in the future and to encourage a more cooperative, responsible, and multilateral foreign policy the United States must significantly reduce its oil use. Before the Iraq war started, Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said: “Regardless of whether we say so publicly, we will go to war, because Saddam sits at the center of a region with more than 60 percent of all the world's oil reserves.” Unfortunately, he was right. In fact, the use of military power to protect the flow of oil has been a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy since 1945. That was the year that President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia that the United States would protect the kingdom in return for special access to Saudi oil—a promise that governs U.S. foreign policy today. This policy was formalized by President Jimmy Carter in 1980 when he announced that the secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf was in “the vital interests of the United States of America” and that America would use “any means necessary, including military force” to protect those interests from outside forces. This doctrine was expanded by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to cover internal threats, and was used by the first President Bush to justify the Gulf War of 1990-91, and provided a key, if unspoken rationale for the second President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. ii The Carter/Reagan Doctrine also led to the build up of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf on a permanent basis and to the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The United States now spends over $50 Billion per year (in peacetime) to maintain our readiness to intervene in the Gulf. iii America has tried to address its oil vulnerability by using our military to protect supply routes and to prop up or install friendly regimes. But as Iraq shows the price is astronomical—$200 Billion and counting. Moreover, it doesn’t work—Iraq is now producing less oil than it did before the invasion. While the reasons behind the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq may be complex, can anyone doubt that we would not be there today if Iraq exported coffee instead of oil? It is time for a new approach. Americans are no longer willing to support U.S. misadventures in the Persian Gulf. Recent polls show that almost two-thirds of Americans think the Iraq war was not worth the price in terms of blood and treasure. Lt. Gen William Odom, director of the National Security Agency during President Reagan's second term, recently said: "The invasion of Iraq will turn out to be the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history." The nation is understandably split about what to do now in Iraq, but there appears to be widespread agreement that America should not make the same mistake again—and we can take a giant step toward that goal by reducing our dependence on oil.

### 1NC 2

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics—displaces voluntary efforts

**Younkins 2k** (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm, JMP)

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion.

If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should:

before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it;

ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...;

recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and

begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes.

Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

### 1NC 3

#### Obama’s pushing unemployment benefits

AAP, 4/7 (“Obama urges House to take up jobless bill,” 4/7/2014, Factiva))

US President Barack Obama is urging the House of Representatives to approve federal jobless benefits for the long-term unemployed.

Obama says the Senate acted in a bipartisan way on Monday by voting to reinstate emergency unemployment insurance for 2.3 million Americans.

In a statement, Obama says Washington must put politics aside to help people make ends meet. He says every week Congress fails to act, about 70,000 long-term unemployed Americans lose benefits.

He urged House Republicans to stop blocking what he calls a bipartisan compromise. He says the House should take up the bill immediately and send it to his desk so the nation can eliminate an economic drag.

#### GOP HATES the plan– link turns case

Serena 11

(The Year of Forests in peril—U.S. House Republicans take aim at protecting forests, Feb 18, 2011, <http://www.forestjustice.org/2011/02/18/the-year-of-forests-in-peril%E2%80%94u-s-house-republicans-take-aim-at-protecting-forests/>, JZG)

House Republicans are set to make huge cuts this week to international forest conservation funds. The U.S. House of Representatives is in session this week and the Republican Party is looking to slash the Federal budget across the board, including devastatingly deep cuts for critical forest conservation programs.In 2009 at the Copenhagen climate summit, Obama pledged to give $1 billion in federal funding over a three year period for forest conservation programs to support REDD (click the link if you’re not familiar with what Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation is all about, or watch the video!)—not only did Obama’s proposed 2011 budget fall short of this promise, but if the House Republican’s have their way, hardly any U.S. money will be made available for protecting global forests and reducing CO2 emissions from deforestation. Already the House republicans have pledged to cut Obama’s budget for international climate funding by 50%.But the news this week only gets worse.The Republicans’ version of the 2011 budget is looking to cut funding for REDD and forestry conservation by any means necessary. This includes slashing funding to key international financing programs like the Global Environment Facility and the Climate Investment Funds, international programs which help support innumerable conservation and climate-related projects and initiatives around the globe who depend on money from wealthy countries like the United States.Of course, the Democrat-led U.S. Senate and President Obama will have a chance to block the House version of the 2011 budget and help protect our forests. Considering 2011 is the International Year of Forests, it would be appalling if the House version of the budget were approved.

#### PC Key

Lowery, 4/8 (Wesley, 4/8/2014, The Washington Post, “Senate moves to restore unemployment benefits,” Factiva))

The Senate voted 59 to 38 Monday in favor of a bill that would restore federal funding for extended jobless benefits for 2.8 million Americans who are considered "long-term unemployed."

The deal, carried by Democratic senators but struck with the support of several prominent Republicans - including Sens. Rob Portman (Ohio), Kelly Ayotte (N.H.) and Mark Kirk (Ill.) - came on the Senate's fourth vote on a bill to renew the benefits.

The measure, which would restore the federal funding that pays for unemployment insurance after state-sponsored insurance ends after 26 weeks, easily passed the Senate on Monday evening and now heads to the House - where Republican House Speaker John A. Boehner (Ohio) has repeatedly signaled that it is unlikely to come up for a vote.

"If our bill was put up for a vote in the House, there is no question it would pass. Contrary to right-wing talking points, many of the people who would benefit [from] this bill are out of work through no fault of their own, and have been knocking on doors and going online looking for a job for months or even years," Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) said in a statement before the Senate vote. "The House needs to extend unemployment benefits to millions of Americans right now, without attaching extraneous issues that are merely an attempt to score political points."

Republican House leaders have repeatedly stated their opposition to the Senate bill, noting that they do not want to bring any unemployment legislation to the floor for a vote unless it includes job-creation provisions.

But House Democrats say they intend to force the issue.

The starting point for Democrats is reenlisting the support of a group of moderate Republicans - Reps. Joseph J. Heck (Nev.), Christopher P. Gibson (N.Y.), David Joyce (Ohio), Frank A. LoBiondo (N.J.), Michael G. Grimm (N.Y.), Peter T. King (N.Y.) and Jon Runyan (N.J.) - who in December signed a letter to Boehner asking the Republican House leadership to consider temporarily extending the benefits.

House Democrats and Republican allies also have begun wearing stickers while they are in the Capitol that include the number of long-term unemployed in their state. House aides say LoBiondo is leading an effort to send another letter, which could include new co-signers.

One of the major variables is what, if any, political capital President Obama is willing to expend toward passage of unemployment insurance extension in the House.

In a statement after the Senate vote, Labor Secretary Thomas Perez urged the House to act.

"Every day of congressional inaction is another day of struggle for the 2.2 million people who are out of work through no fault of their own," Perez said. "I've heard from governors and labor secretaries from both parties who are ready and able to implement this vital program for their residents. I encourage the House to vote and send this legislation to President Obama's desk for his signature."

Were Obama to commit to pressing the issue - perhaps through a series of speeches like the ones he has given around the country in recent weeks about minimum wage legislation - it could ramp up pressure on House Republicans, especially those facing reelection in states with high unemployment rates.

Republican aides agree that an aggressive campaign by the White House has the potential to greatly change the legislative dynamic.

#### Key to economy

Ayres, 13 – Policy Analyst in the Economic Policy department at the Center for American Progress (11/20/2013, Sarah, “Why Congress Must Extend Emergency Unemployment Benefits,” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2013/11/20/79726/why-congress-must-extend-emergency-unemployment-benefits/>))

This is because unemployment benefits are not just good for workers; they are also good for the economy. By putting money into the pockets of people who will spend it, unemployment benefits boost demand, spur economic growth, and create jobs. In fact, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office has found that unemployment benefits are one of the most effective fiscal policies to increase economic growth and employment. Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, has found that every $1 spent on unemployment insurance grows the economy by $1.55. All these dollars circulating through the economy create jobs. According to an Economic Policy Institute analysis, extending emergency unemployment benefits would create 310,000 additional jobs in 2014.

Extending unemployment benefits is also important because there are still too many Americans who cannot find work. The national unemployment rate remains relatively high at 7.2 percent, and workers in many parts of the country are facing much higher rates of unemployment. The unemployment rate in Michigan, for example, is 9.1 percent, which means that ending emergency unemployment compensation would cut off 130,300 Michiganders from benefits at a time when the labor market is still incredibly weak; unemployment benefits in that state have already been cut by more than half in the past two years.

Maintaining federal emergency unemployment benefits is crucial because state benefits are not sufficient at a time when Americans are out of work for longer periods of time than ever before. While the average unemployed person is out of work and searching for a new job for 36 weeks, states only provide unemployment benefits for a maximum of 26 weeks. Not surprisingly, close to half of unemployed workers run out of state unemployment benefits before finding a new job. Federal extended benefits provide much-needed income support during this time, when many Americans would otherwise be unable to pay their rent or put food on the table.

Unemployment benefits also prevent millions of Americans from falling into poverty. A Congressional Research Service analysis found that unemployment benefits lifted 3.3 million people out of poverty in 2009, including nearly 1 million children living with a family member who received unemployment benefits. The same study found that the poverty rate for families who received unemployment benefits was about half of what it would have been without those benefits. By extending unemployment benefits, we keep millions of families afloat and out of poverty.

Federal cuts have already dramatically reduced the amount of unemployment benefits available to workers. In early 2012, Congress cut the number of weeks of federal unemployment benefits available to all states and raised the unemployment-rate threshold at which states can receive maximum benefits. Now, federal unemployment benefits in every state are significantly less generous than in the recent past. Unemployment benefits have dropped by more than 50 percent in some states, including Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and North Carolina. (see interactive for state-by-state reductions in unemployment benefits) Only one in three long-term unemployed workers already receives federal benefits; if Congress allows emergency unemployment compensation to expire, only one in four jobless workers would receive benefits. Moreover, sequestration has resulted in a decrease in the weekly benefit amount. The average worker now collects just $269 per week, compared to $296 one year ago.

America cannot afford the human and economic costs of ending emergency unemployment compensation now. Congress should immediately approve legislation that fully extends emergency unemployment benefits through 2014.

#### Nuke war

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 1NC 4

#### economic engagement aid or a trade agreement

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### doubling engagement in three years is a substantial increase

Indo-US Business 9 [Indo-US Business, bimonthly publication by New Media Communication Pvt. Ltd. and the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, “Report: Target $320 bn by 2018: Mission Possible,” May-June 2009, http://www.newmediacomm.com/publication/indo\_us/mayjun09/report.html]

This report has been prepared in the context of new governments in both countries and examines the potential of bilateral economic engagement in the next 10 years.¶ The report says: “Considering that India, a country with a GDP of around $1 trillion, accounts for a mere 1.3 percent of US trade, there is substantial potential to increase bilateral trade. The two countries should set a target of doubling bilateral trade every three years, which would mean a trade level of $320 billion by 2018, an eight-time increase over nine years. It is also recommended to set in place a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement covering both goods and services.”¶ The report emphasizes that Indo-US economic relations in the next years can attain the following dimensions:¶ • Strategic shift from high-technology trade to frontier technology India and USA can be close partners in expanding knowledge frontiers in science and technology, including space, robotics, nuclear energy, defense, etc. and their business applications. India can play a key role in signature multi-country projects in space, oceanography, polar exploration, etc.¶ • Robust trade in mass-market and niche products Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, including goods, to be set in place to take advantage of complementary competitiveness. Set a target of $320 billion in ten years, with robust bilateral investments leading the way for high volume turnover. Quality and safety would be the basis for exchange.¶ • High interface in services trade Strong bilateral engagement across diverse services sectors. This would involve significant liberalization of the Indian services economy on the one hand, and easy movement of personnel across borders on the other.¶ • Preferred investment destinations Scale up mutual investments massively. An investment treaty should be rapidly negotiated. US investors should have a leading role in the economic transformation of India. US companies can emerge as key partners for Indian business.¶ • Building infrastructure in India India needs over $475 billion in investments over the next five years to sustain a high growth rate of 8-9 percent. The US private sector can find a big opportunity in the next decade in India's need for capacity building in infrastructure. Collaboration in this regard would prove to be a mutually beneficial partnership.¶ • Collaboration on clean energy and climate change India's rapid development makes it one of the fastest-growing energy users and carbon emitters. US is the largest energy user and highest carbon emitter after China. Both countries can collaborate closely on energy security, emissions, efficiency, and renewable energy as well as on global discussions on mitigating climate change.¶ • Collaboration in healthcare: US and India to collaborate in making healthcare more affordable and accessible worldwide. Healthcare market in India was nearly at $ 38 billion in 2007, expected to grow at 15 percent per annum to reach $ 79 billion by 2012. Tremendous opportunities can be found in providing healthcare services, building healthcare infrastructure and developing related technologies.¶ • Seamless cross-continental cooperation in knowledge economy sectors India and the US to be anchors for global interaction in sectors such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, drug development, renewable energy, green products, etc. R&D, innovation, and academic collaborations to be close and continuous, rooted in strong IP protection.¶ • Strong cooperation in education and academia Participation in each other's higher education and research sectors. Centers of educational excellence should open campuses in the other country to offer students the best of education in their place of residence. This would also enable high-level continuous exchange of professors, researchers and academics, and cross-cultural educational interchange.¶ • It is crucial to engage the private sectors of both countries in a strong partnership at all enterprise and sector levels. Governments can guide and aid private sector partnerships.¶ Though India-US economic relations have moved into a new phase of intensive interaction since 2000, the recent Indo-US nuclear agreement can act as a springboard for a new trajectory of bilateral economic engagement.¶ Global Economic Crisis & Opportunities¶ The global economic crisis, which has hit the US hard, creates a new opportunity for both sides to not only leverage each other's advantages, but also provide mutually support. While the US seeks markets for its industry products, India needs technology and expertise for faster development and global integration. In the medium term, protectionist measures must be avoided. Over the longer term of 10 years, India and the US can become much more significant economic partners.¶ To ensure that the synergies of both countries complement each other, the governments need to address internal barriers to trade and investment. India needs to undertake pending reforms to open up sectors of interest to US businesses and improve the investment climate. Similarly, the US must work towards reducing barriers for trade and investments from India and facilitate freer movement of professionals between the countries. The US must view India as a strategic partner and rank it high in its economic priorities.¶ Following Measures Are Needed:¶ • A Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement to cover goods and services¶ • A Bilateral Investment Treaty¶ • Opening up of key sectors such as retail and higher education in India to FDI¶ • Freer movement of people under H1-B visa scheme¶ • The private sectors of both sides must be an integral part of the new engagement. Industry associations on both sides must take the lead in overcoming the information barrier, building brand relevance, and forging new business ventures.¶ • Cooperation must shift to interaction between regions, industry sectors, and enterprises of all sizes.¶ Though India has felt the impact of the global meltdown in terms of falling production and exports, the situation is not alarmingly dire so far due to high savings and investment rates, consistent internal demand, low exports in relation to GDP, and strong measures to counteract the crisis. Recovery in India is expected to be faster and steeper than the global norm.¶ In the US, mitigation and containment is the immediate urgency. Indicators are expected to show positive signs from the third quarter of 2009. A crisis of demand, following on the heels of financial and confidence seizure, will be the key factor to be resolved, going forward. Within this scenario, US companies may consider it profitable to examine opportunities in India's infrastructure and consumer durables sectors.¶ It is important that the US and India do not indulge in protectionist measures and lower each other's market access. Proposals that limit H1-B visas, create non-tariff barriers to trade, mandate use of local products, etc should not dominate for a protracted period. Business should be left unfettered to re-energize respective economies.¶ It may be reiterated that substantial increase in economic engagement would require intensive policy measures on both sides. More particularly, India would need to progress much faster on overall trade and economic liberalization and reforms to facilitate greater participation of overseas businesses in its economy. Areas that need to be addressed include agriculture, infrastructure, direct and indirect taxes, investment facilitation, administrative procedures, financial sector, services including retail trade, mining, etc

#### Cuba/Venezuela/Mexico means the country’s government

Martin- prof of social sciences- 9

(Brain, 2009, A Review of General Semantics, “Statist Language,” <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/09etc.html>, mat)

It is a long-standing convention that the name of a country refers to its government or some action by sections of the government. For example, "Iraq invaded Kuwait" means that Iraqi military forces - under the control of the government of Iraq, in particular Saddam Hussein - invaded the territory known as Kuwait.

#### Its is possessive

English Grammar 5

(Glossary of English Grammar Terms, <http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html>)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive [pronouns](http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/pronoun.html) used to substitute a [noun](http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/noun.html) and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### Vote negative because the plan doesn’t meet the best definition of “engagement” — key to precise limits and predictable ground

### 1NC 5

#### Mexico should adopt and fund a ‘One Health’ approach outlined by the Institute of Development Studies as a zoonotic disease preparation and response strategy.

That solves

Institute of Development Studies, 13

(IDS, January 2013, Issue 2, “Rapid Response Briefing: ZOONOSES - FROM PANIC TO PLANNING”, <http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3269/Zoonoses%20Rapid%20Response%20Briefing%20Final.pdf?sequence=1>, amp)

The importance of a ‘One Health’ approach Current approaches to zoonotic disease management are fragmented. Veterinarians deal with livestock disease, wildlife specialists with wild animal populations, ecologists with ecosystem biodiversity and public health experts with human disease. Meanwhile, separate groups work on disease management and disease eradication. A more integrated and strategic research and development effort is needed on disease surveillance, management and eradication to assist risk-based and cost-effective zoonoses prevention and control options for poor people in developing countries. When zoonotic outbreaks occur they can massively disrupt development and poverty reduction efforts. The US Institute of Medicine observed that it was ‘unable to identify a single example of a well-functioning, integrated zoonotic disease surveillance system across human and animal sectors’. There is evidently a need and a demand for a new approach. ‘One Health’ seeks to replace the disease-centred approach to zoonoses with a system-based one. It consists of the collaborative effort of multiple disciplines, working locally, nationally and globally, to attain optimal health for people, animals and the environment. ‘One Health’ can play a role in catalysing better preparedness and surveillance that are informed by cross-disciplinary approaches. It could also help accelerate research discoveries, enhance the efficacy of response and prevention efforts, and improve education and care. Policy actors are hindered in embracing ‘One Health’ policymaking by the global health governance system. An important part of realigning policy to embrace ‘One Health’ will be a refocusing from the current disease-centred approach to a holistic perspective that values human health, animal health and the environment. Key recommendations 1. Ring-fence long-term funding There is currently a tendency for responses to be reactive to crises. As each new disease threat emerges, prior threats are easily forgotten. However, planning and long-term strategies for disease control are key. Resources also need to be made available to control and manage endemic diseases, even when the threat is not visible. Many diseases are possible to control if this advice is followed. Brucellosis in livestock is a good example. In most developed countries, programmes, compensation and financial incentives for disease-free herds have more or less eliminated the disease, but in developing countries it remains a neglected endemic zoonosis. For diseases of global importance, investments need to be made with general, rather than specific, disease use in mind. This will save money and resources and, as clustered diseases are easier to control, transform geographical weaknesses into strengths. National platforms and structures established as a result of large avian influenza investments could provide the basis for long-term, cross-sector collaboration for other zoonotic diseases. With their remit broadened they could establish the basis needed for surveillance and management of both endemic and epidemic disease. 2. Plan for uncertain futures Disease emergence is inherently uncertain. Even with improved scientific modelling and surveillance, planning must get to grips with uncertainty and ignorance. This requires an approach centred on adaptive management, in which constant observation and careful experimentation are combined. While large-scale modelling efforts can improve our understanding of zoonoses risk factors and disease locations, these need to be complemented by contextual understandings. Local people are often best placed to become the ‘adaptive managers’ of animals, ecosystems and disease, albeit with the support from cross-sectoral agencies. 3. Improve measurement and mapping There is massive under-reporting of zoonoses. A recent high-level group convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended assessing the societal burden of disease attributable to zoonoses. Zoonoses mapping is essential to help decision-makers plan and manage disease control, as well as to identify disease hotspots and allow for prioritisation. Further research work on disease dynamics also needs to be undertaken, particularly in areas where there is evidence of infection but not disease outbreak. For example, to understand why one in five people in Gabon have antibodies to the Ebola virus with no apparent ill-effect. 4. Improve systemic surveillance Zoonoses surveillance needs to be reinforced and maintained at national and international levels. If effective surveillance systems are in place for ‘what we do know’ then we are better prepared to deal with ‘what we don’t know’. Improved monitoring provides a more accurate, real-time estimate of disease burden and impact and allows for better planning. Better monitoring should also lead to improved understanding of the impact of successful policy options and greater motivation for control. Surveillance and monitoring need to shift from a focus on a disease or specific event to the whole system, looking at interactions between disease drivers and disease incidence at the community level, as well as poverty and equity impacts. Such systemic surveillance approaches will require new organisational arrangements and diverse expertise, including direct involvement of local people affected by disease. 5. Develop more flexible and collaborative working Improving human, animal and ecosystem health needs to be viewed as a cooperative endeavour. International leadership and coordination is important to stop zoonoses falling through the gaps between different disciplines and sectoral responsibilities. **There is good cooperation between the** Wolrd Health Organization (**WHO**), Food and Agriculture Organization (**FAO**) **and World Organization for Animal Health** (OIE) **on ‘One Health’, but** this cooperation and **political commitment needs to be translated to national** and local **levels.** A promising development is the emergence of cross-sectoral ‘zoonoses groups’ in several countries. Cross-sector working also ensures better preparedness and contingency planning, more efficient and effective surveillance systems, cost-sharing between sectors according to their benefits of control, increased health equity and improved sharing of logistics and costs for service provision. 6. Draw on multiple forms of expertise Complex processes with uncertain outcomes require multiple sources of expertise. This means combining modelling and data collection approaches. For example, satellite technology led to successful prediction of a RVF outbreak in 2006/7, providing a two to six week period of warning which enabled resources to be mobilised to contain the epidemic. Participatory approaches can also lead to new understandings and strategies, especially in the developing world where detailed data sources are often unavailable. Very often in remote areas, without public health and veterinary coverage, it is local people who know most about disease dynamics and impacts. Mobile phone technologies and social media have potential uses in new forms of participatory surveillance and disease monitoring. 7. Develop a ‘One Health’ approach that is justice- and rights-based Zoonotic diseases have a disproportionate impact on the poor. Interventions therefore must integrate poverty reduction, ecosystem management and disease control. This means assessing the costs of intervention and control. Too often the impacts on people’s lives and livelihoods are neither assessed or considered and may be greater than the local costs of the disease. Equally, issues of access to disease prevention and control measures must be evaluated. Who will gain access to vaccines or drugs in an epidemic? Who will pay? Who will benefit? There are always winners and losers, and equity remains an important consideration. A ‘One Health’ approach must be justice- and rights-based. It should incorporate a balanced assessment of the pros and cons of alternative control and response approaches which ensures that the poor and marginalised do not lose out.

### 1NC 6

#### The State of California should establish a Mexico policy that includes substantial reforestation finance. of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Mexico. The State of California should also incorporate reforestation financing into its domestic state policy.

The United States Department of Agriculture should provide substantial reforestation finance to Mexico.

#### Current agreements prove California can solve the aff

Advanced Global Trading 13

(Mexican state will continue California REDD partnership, August 04, 2013, <http://advancedglobaltrading.com/mexican-state-will-continue-california-redd-partnership/#.U0twRj_lyno>, JZG)

The Mexican state of Chiapas, one of two regions outside the United States that can supply California with carbon credits, said Monday it has no plans to suspend its program to reduce emissions from deforestation (REDD), countering claims made by some green groups last week.Pablo Morales, a press officer at Chiapas environment secretariat, said a bulletin published by a Mexican affiliate of environmental group Friends of the Earth last week that said Chiapas had suspended its REDD program was inaccurate.That document, which attributed news of the suspension to Chiapas Environment Secretary Carlos Morales Vázquez, was quickly circulated by other organizations in the US, which created confusion.The Friends of the Earth note was based on an article from Chiapas newspaper El Heraldo, which quoted Vázquez saying the program didn’t work and would be cancelled.A spokesperson for Vazquez said the newspaper story was incorrect and that the secretary had referred to another program.“Chiapas will maintain an open dialogue and collaboration with the national and other state governments in order to strengthen the programs and public policies in benefit of Chiapas’ development, among others the (agreement) with California,” according to a state government statement.California entered into a partnership in 2009 with 19 states and provinces from Indonesia to Peru to help advance sub-national programs to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) using the carbon market as a financial incentive.Program s in two of those states – Chiapas and the Brazilian state of Acre, were chosen by California to potentially supply the U.S. state with carbon credits from their REDD programs.

### 1NC 7

#### Empirically US deforestation in Mexico is used to disposes indigenous people of their land and expand the influence of the government

REDD Monitor 11 (Statement from Chiapas, Mexico: REDD project is a climate mask “to cover up the dispossession of the biodiversity of the peoples”, September 7 2011, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2011/09/07/statement-from-chiapas-mexico-redd-project-is-a-climate-mask-to-cover-up-the-dispossession-of-the-biodiversity-of-the-peoples/, HSA)

¶ To the people of Mexico, to the people of the world, to the organizations and groups that do not serve the power interests but those of their own people, the lower classes.¶ On 20 and 21 August, the communities of the region had a forum in the Amador Hernandez common area entitled: Regional Forum Against the Lacandona Brecha (the official border that would delimit the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve) and the Capitalist Looting of the Lacandon Jungle, and we approved the following:¶ D E C L A R A T I O N¶ We reject and will not tire of confirming our rejection of the passing through the Lacandona Brecha next to our lands because it has as its purpose to make available the lands in the [Biosphere Reserve] to the service of the capitalist powers.¶ The REDD+ project in the Montes Azules Reserve is the new mask, a climate mask, with which the federal government of Felipe Calderon and the Chiapas government of Juan Sabines attempt to cover up the dispossession of the biodiversity of the peoples.¶ Speaking of climate change, it is clear to us that those who are most responsible are the capitalist enterprises and their governments, just like the federal government of Felipe Calderon and the Chiapas government of Juan Sabines, who have made a pact with the wealthy countries to allow that their greenhouse gas emissions be mitigated by the forests of our people.¶ We reject all the ways in which the federal and the Chiapas governments and directors of organizations in service to the capitalists, want to dispossess us of our lands and our resources, through programs such as: REDD+ (in the Montes Azules Reserve), Reconversion Productiva (Productive Restructuring), Pago de Servicios Ambientales (Payment for Environmental Services) and FANAR (Fund for Agricultural Entities without Regularization).¶ We point out the dual purpose of these programs: to dispossess us, but also to change our culture in order to disorganize us and neutralize our resistance.¶ We denounce the control that the federal government exercises over the people which, by decree (1972), it called the Lacandon, and which it has been using to legitimize all the plans for taking the lands and displacement of our peoples.¶ We reject the projects for tourism by the capitalists or of the federal or Chiapas governments, such as the one that has divided the common lands of Emiliano Zapata in Laguna de Miramar.¶ We reject monocultures, especially for biofuels and the new peonage that the peasant undergoes on his own land, just as the big landowners imposed in times of the Porfirio dictatorship.¶ We reject the policy of land seizures promoted by the World Bank, conservationist organizations and their neo-liberal governments like that of Chiapas.¶ Likewise, we reject the other face of “development:” mining projects approved for regions that are not important for conservation and transnational exploitation of diversity, as happens in the Municipality of Chicomuselo where the people are resisting.¶ We demand agrarian regularization of the communities of Galilea, Benito Juarez Miramar and Chumcerro, located within the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.¶ W E P R O P O S E¶ To reorganize ourselves and expand at every level our relationships with other peoples and with independent organizations that are not at the service of the powerful in order to build a network of resistance among the peoples.¶ To develop internal plans in our communities to strengthen the production of our own foods.

#### The that re-entrenches colonial racism and means the aff fails --their epistemologically flawed

Escobar, PhD, 95—Studied engineering and sciences during his undergraduate studies, completing a Bachelors of Science in Chemical Engineering from the University of Valle in Cali, Colombia biochemistry graduate studies at the Universidad del Valle Medical School. Master's Degree in Food Science and International Nutrition at Cornell University, interdisciplinary PhD at the University of California, Berkeley in Development Philosophy, Policy and Planning.[ has taught at universities mostly in the United States, but also in Colombia, Finland, Barcelona and England. (Arturo, “Encountering Development,” Princeton University Press, chm)ellipses in original

There is a sense in which **rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments**. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress. —United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, 1951¶ IN HIS inaugural address as president of the United States on January 20, 1949, Harry Truman announced his concept of a “fair deal” for the entire world. An essential component of this concept was his appeal to the United States and the world to solve the problems of the “underdeveloped areas” of the globe.¶ More than **half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery.** Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the ﬁrst time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. . . . I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the beneﬁts of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. . . . What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democractic fair dealing. . . . Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientiﬁc and technical knowledge. (Tru- man [1949] 1964)¶ The Truman doctrine initiated a new era in the understanding and manage- ment of world affairs, particularly those concerning the less economically accomplished countries of the world. The intent was quite ambitious: to¶ 4 CHAPTER 1¶ bring about the conditions necessary to replicating the world over the fea- tures that characterized the “advanced” societies of the time—high levels of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and the widespread adoption of modern education and cultural values. In Truman’s vision, capi- tal, science, and technology were the main ingredients that would make this massive revolution possible. Only in this way could the American dream of peace and abundance be extended to all the peoples of the planet. This dream was not solely the creation of the United States but the result of the speciﬁc historical conjuncture at the end of the Second World War. Within a few years, the dream was universally embraced by those in power. The dream was not seen as an easy process, however; predictably perhaps, the obstacles perceived ahead contributed to consolidating the mission. One of the most inﬂuential documents of the period, prepared by a group of experts convened by the United Nations with the objective of designing concrete policies and measures “for the economic development of underde- veloped countries,” put it thus:¶ There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their ex- pectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress. (United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs [1951], 15)1¶ The report suggested no less than a total restructuring of “underdeveloped” societies. The statement quoted earlier might seem to us today **amazingly ethnocentric and arrogant,** at best naive; yet what has to be explained is precisely the fact that it was uttered and that it made perfect sense. The statement exempliﬁed a growing will to transform drastically two-thirds of the world in the pursuit of the goal of material prosperity and economic progress. By the early 1950s, **such a will had become hegemonic at the level of the circles of power**. This book tells the story of this dream and how it **progressively turned into a nightmare**. For instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development pro- duced its opposite: **massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression**. The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, **increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure** of forty years of development. In this way, this book can be read as the history of the loss of an illusion, in which many genuinely believed. Above all, however, it is about how **the “Third World” has been produced by the discourses and practices of development since their inception** in the early post–World War II period.¶ 5INTRODUCTION¶ ORIENTALISM,AFRICANISM, AND DEVELOPMENTALISM¶ Until the late 1970s, the central stake in discussions on Asia, Africa, and Latin America was the nature of development. As we will see, from the economic development theories of the 1950s to the “basic human needs approach” of the 1970s—which emphasized not only economic growth per se as in earlier decades but also the distribution of the beneﬁts of growth— the main preoccupation of theorists and politicians was the kinds of develop- ment that needed to be pursued to solve the social and economic problems of these parts of the world. Even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies were obliged to couch their critique in terms of the need for devel- opment, through concepts such as “another development,” “participatory development,” “socialist development,” and the like. In short, one could criticize a given approach and propose modiﬁcations or improvements ac- cordingly, but the fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not be doubted. Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary. Indeed, it seemed impossible to conceptualize social reality in other terms. Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and omnipresent real- ity of development: governments designing and implementing ambitious development plans, institutions carrying out development programs in city and countryside alike, experts of all kinds studying underdevelopment and producing theories ad nauseam. The fact that **c** with the passing of time did not seem to bother most experts. Reality, in sum, had been colonized by the develop- ment discourse, and those who were dissatisﬁed with this state of affairs had to struggle for bits and pieces of freedom within it, in the hope that in the process a different reality could be constructed.2 More recently, however, the development of new tools of analysis, in gestation since the late 1960s but the application of which became widespread only during the 1980s, has made possible analyses of this type of “coloniza- tion of reality” which seek to account for this very fact: how certain representations become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which reality is imagined and acted upon. Foucault’s work on the dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of social reality, in particular, has been instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of dis- course produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualify- ing and even making others impossible. Extensions of Foucault’s insights to colonial and postcolonial situations by authors such as Edward Said, V. Y. Mudimbe, Chandra Mohanty, and Homi Bhabha, among others, have opened up new ways of thinking about representations of the Third World. Anthropology’s self-critique and renewal during the 1980s have also been important in this regard. Thinking of development in terms of discourse makes it possible to main-¶ 6 CHAPTER 1¶ tain the focus on domination—as earlier Marxist analyses, for instance, did—and at the same time to explore more fruitfully the conditions of possi- bility and the most pervasive effects of development. Discourse analysis cre- ates the possibility of “stand[ing] detached from [the development dis- course], bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze the theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated” (Foucault 1986, 3). It gives us the possibility of singling out “development” as an encompassing cultural space and at the same time of separating ourselves from it by per- ceiving it in a totally new form. This is the task the present book sets out to accomplish. To see development as a historically produced discourse entails an exam- ination of why so many countries started to see themselves as underdevel- oped in the early post–World War II period, how “to develop” became a fundamental problem for them, and how, ﬁnally, they embarked upon the task of “un-underdeveloping” themselves by subjecting their societies to increasingly systematic, detailed, and comprehensive interventions. As Western experts and politicians started to see certain conditions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a problem—mostly what was perceived as pov- erty and backwardness—a new domain of thought and experience, namely, development, came into being, resulting in a new strategy for dealing with the alleged problems. Initiated in the United States and Western Europe, this strategy became in a few years a powerful force in the Third World. The study of development as discourse is akin to Said’s study of the dis- courses on the Orient. “Orientalism,” writes Said,¶ can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Ori- ent. . . . My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse we cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which Eu- ropean culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, ideologically, scientiﬁcally, and imaginatively during the post- Enlightenment period. (1979, 3)¶ Since its publication, Orientalism has sparked a number of creative studies and inquiries about representations of the Third World in various contexts, although few have dealt explicitly with the question of development. Never- theless, the general questions some of these works raised serve as markers for the analysis of development as a regime of representation. In his excel- lent book The Invention of Africa, the African philosopher V. Y. Mudimbe, for example, states his objective thus: “To study the theme of the founda- tions of discourse about Africa . . . [how] African worlds have been estab- lished as realities for knowledge” (1988, xi) in Western discourse. His con-¶ 7INTRODUCTION¶ cern, moreover, goes beyond “the ‘invention’ of Africanism as a scientiﬁc discipline” (9), particularly in anthropology and philosophy, in order to in- vestigate the “ampliﬁcation” by African scholars of the work of critical Euro- pean thinkers, particularly Foucault and Lévi-Strauss. Although Mudimbe ﬁnds that even in the most Afrocentric perspectives the Western epistemo- logical order continues to be both context and referent, he nevertheless ﬁnds some works in which critical European insights are being carried even fur- ther than those works themselves anticipated. What is at stake for these latter works, Mudimbe explains, is a critical reinterpretation of African his- tory as it has been seen from Africa’s (epistemological, historical, and geo- graphical) exteriority, indeed, a weakening of the very notion of Africa. This, for Mudimbe, implies a radical break in African anthropology, history, and ideology. Critical work of this kind, Mudimbe believes, may open the way for “the process of refounding and reassuming an interrupted historicity within rep- resentations” (183), in other words, the process by which Africans can have greater autonomy over how they are represented and how they can con- struct their own social and cultural models in ways not so mediated by a Western episteme and historicity—albeit in an increasingly transnational context. This notion can be extended to the Third World as a whole, for what is at stake is the process by which, in the history of the modern West, non- European areas have been systematically organized into, and transformed according to, European constructs. Representations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as Third World and underdeveloped are the heirs of an illus- trious genealogy of Western conceptions about those parts of the world.3 Timothy Mitchell unveils another important mechanism at work in Euro- pean representations of other societies. Like Mudimbe, Mitchell’s goal is to explore “the peculiar methods of order and truth that characterise the mod- ern West” (1988, ix) and their impact on nineteenth-century Egypt. The setting up of the world as a picture, in the model of the world exhibitions of the last century, Mitchell suggests, is at the core of these methods and their political expediency. For the modern (European) subject, this entailed that s/he would experience life as if s/he were set apart from the physical world, as if s/he were a visitor at an exhibition. The observer inevitably “enframed” external reality in order to make sense of it; this enframing took place ac- cording to European categories. What emerged was a regime of objectivism in which Europeans were subjected to a double demand: to be detached and objective, and yet to immerse themselves in local life. This experience as participant observer was made possible by a curious trick, that of eliminating from the picture the presence of the European observer (see also Clifford 1988, 145); in more concrete terms, observing the (colonial) world as object “from a position that is invisible and set apart” (Mitchell 1988, 28). The West had come to live “as though the world were¶ 8 CHAPTER 1¶ divided in this way into two: into a realm of mere representations and a realm of the ‘real’; into exhibitions and an external reality; into an order of mere models, descriptions or copies, and an order of the original” (32). **This regime of order and truth is a quintessential aspect of modernity and has been deepened by economics** and development. It is reﬂected in an objec- tivist and empiricist stand that dictates that the Third World and its peoples exist “out there,” to be known through theories and intervened upon from the outside. The consequences of this feature of modernity have been enormous. Chandra Mohanty, for example, refers to the same feature when raising the questions of who produces knowledge about Third World women and from what spaces; she discovered that women in the Third World are represented in most feminist literature on development as having “needs” and “prob- lems” but few choices and no freedom to act. What emerges from such modes of analysis is the image of an average Third World woman, con- structed through the use of statistics and certain categories:¶ This average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being “third world” (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victim- ized, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bod- ies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions. (1991b, 56)¶ These representations **implicitly assume Western standards as the bench- mark** against which to measure the situation of Third World women. The result, Mohanty believes, is a paternalistic attitude on the part of Western women toward their Third World counterparts and, more generally, the perpetuation of **the hegemonic idea of the West’s superiority**. Within this discursive regime, works about Third World women develop a certain co- herence of effects that **reinforces that hegemony**. “It is in this process of discursive homogenization and systematization of the oppression of women in the third world,” Mohanty concludes, “that power is exercised in much of recent Western feminist discourse, and this power needs to be deﬁned and named” (54).4 Needless to say, Mohanty’s critique applies with greater pertinence to mainstream development literature, in which there exists a veritable under- developed subjectivity endowed with features such as powerlessness, pas- sivity, poverty, and ignorance, **usually dark and lacking in historical agency, as if waiting for the (white) Western hand** to help subjects along and not infrequently hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubborn- ness, lack of initiative, and traditions. This image also universalizes and ho- mogenizes Third World cultures in an ahistorical fashion. Only from a cer- tain Western perspective does this description make sense; that it exists at¶ 9INTRODUCTION¶ all is It is important to highlight for now that the deployment of this discourse in a world system in which the West has a certain dominance over the Third World has profound political, economic, and cultural effects that have to be explored. The production of discourse under conditions of unequal power is what Mohanty and others refer to as “the colonialist move.” This move entails speciﬁc constructions of the colonial / Third World subject in/through dis- course in ways that allow the exercise of power over it. Colonial discourse, although “the most theoretically underdeveloped form of discourse,” ac- cording to Homi Bhabha, is “crucial to the binding of a range of differences and discriminations that inform the discursive and political practices **of racial and cultural hierarchizatio**n” (1990, 72). Bhabha’s deﬁnition of colonial discourse, although complex, is illuminating:¶ [Colonial discourse] is an apparatus that turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/. Its predominant strategic function historical differences is the creation of a space for a “subject peoples” through the production of knowl- edges in terms of which surveillance is exercised and a complex form of plea- sure/unpleasure is incited. . . . The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and in- struction. . . . I am referring to a form of governmentality that in marking out a “subject nation,” appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of ac- tivity. (1990, 75)¶ Although some of the terms of this deﬁnition might be more applicable to the colonial context strictly speaking, the development discourse is gov- erned by the same principles; it has created an extremely efﬁcient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World. This apparatus came into existence roughly in the period 1945 to 1955 and has not since ceased to produce new arrangements of knowledge and power, new practices, theories, strategies, and so on. In sum, it has successfully deployed a regime of government over the Third World, a “space for ‘subject peoples’” that ensures certain control over it. This space is also a geopolitical space, a series of imaginative geographies, to use Said’s (1979) term. The development discourse inevitably contained a geopolitical imagination that has shaped the meaning of development for more than four decades. For some, this will to spatial power is one of the most essential features of development (Slater 1993). It is implicit in expres- sions such as First and Third World, North and South, center and periphery. The social production of space implicit in these terms is bound with the production of differences, subjectivities, and social orders. Despite the cor- rectives introduced to this geopolitics—the decentering of the world, the¶ 10 CHAPTER 1¶ demise of the Second World, the emergence of a network of world cities, the globalization of cultural production, and so on—they continue to function imaginatively in powerful ways. There is a relation among history, geogra- phy, and modernity that resists disintegration as far as the Third World is concerned, despite the important changes that have given rise to postmod- ern geographies (Soja 1989).¶ To sum up, I propose to speak of development as a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action, by analyzing the characteristics and interrelations of the three axes that deﬁne it: the forms of knowledge that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this dis- course, those through which people come to recognize themselves as devel- oped or underdeveloped. The ensemble of forms found along these axes constitutes development as a discursive formation, giving rise to an efﬁcient apparatus that systematically relates forms of knowledge and techiques of power.5 The analysis will thus be couched in terms of regimes of discourse and representation. Regimes of representation can be analyzed as places of en- counter where identities are constructed and also where violence is origi- nated, symbolized, and managed. This useful hypothesis, developed by a Colombian scholar to explain nineteenth-century violence in her country, building particularly on the works of Bakhtin, Foucault, and Girard, con- ceives of regimes of representation as places of encounter of languages of the past and languages of the present (such as the languages of “civilization” and “barbarism” in postindependence Latin America), internal and external lan- guages, and languages of self and other (Rojas de Ferro 1994). A similar encounter of regimes of representation took place in the late 1940s with the emergence of development, also accompanied by speciﬁc forms of **modern- ized violence**.6 The notion of regimes of representation is a ﬁnal theoretical and method- ological principle for examining the mechanisms for, and consequences of, the construction of the Third World in/through representation. Charting regimes of representation of the Third World brought about by the develop- ment discourse represents an attempt to draw the “cartographies” (Deleuze 1988 . These are also cartographies of struggle, as Mo- hanty (1991a) adds. Although they are geared toward an understanding of the conceptual maps that are used to locate and chart Third World people’s experience, they also reveal—even if indirectly at times—the categories with which people have to struggle. This book provides a general map for orienting oneself in the discourses and practices that account for today’s¶ 11INTRODUCTION¶ dominant forms of sociocultural and economic production of the Third World. The goals of this book are precisely to examine the establishment and consolidation of this discourse and apparatus from the early post–World War II period to the present (chapter 2); analyze the construction of a notion of underdevelopment in post–World War II economic development theo- ries (chapter 3); and demonstrate the way in which the apparatus functions through the systematic production of knowldege and power in speciﬁc ﬁelds—such as rural development, sustainable development, and women and development (chapters 4 and 5). Finally, the conclusion deals with the important question of how to imagine a postdevelopment regime of repre- sentation and how to investigate and pursue alternative practices in the con- text of today’s social movements in the Third World. This, one might say, is a study of developmentalism as a discursive ﬁeld. Unlike Said’s study of Orientalism, however, I pay closer attention to the deployment of the discourse through practices. I want to show that this discourse results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is produced. The example I chose for this closer investi- gation is the implementation of rural development, health, and nutrition programs in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Another difference in relation to Orientalism originates in Homi Bhabha’s caution that “there is always, in Said, the suggestion that colonial power is possessed entirely by the colonizer, given its intentionality and unidirectionality” (1990, 77). This is a danger I seek to avoid by considering the variety of forms with which Third World people resist development interventions and how they struggle to create alternative ways of being and doing. Like Mudimbe’s study of Africanism, I also want to unveil the foundations of an order of knowledge and a discourse about the Third World as underde- veloped. I want to map, so to say, the invention of development. Instead of focusing on anthropology and philosophy, however, I contextualize the era of development within the overall space of modernity, **particularly modern economic practices**. From this perspective, development can be seen as a chapter of what can be called an anthropology of modernity, that is, a general investigation of Western modernity as a culturally and historically speciﬁc phenomenon. If it is true that there is an “anthropological structure” (Fou- cault 1975, 198) that sustains the modern order and its human sciences, it must be investigated to what extent this structure has also given rise to the regime of development, perhaps as a speciﬁc mutation of modernity. A gen- eral direction for this anthropology of modernity has already been sug- gested, in the sense of rendering “exotic” the West’s cultural products in order to see them for what they are: “We need to anthropologize the West: show how exotic its constitution of reality has been; emphasize those do- mains most taken for granted as universal (this includes epistemology and¶ 12 CHAPTER 1¶ economics); make them seem as historically peculiar as possible; show how their claims to truth are linked to social practices and have hence become effective forces in the social world” (Rabinow 1986, 241). The anthropology of modernity would rely on ethnographic approaches that look at social forms as produced by historical practices combining knowledge and power; it would seek to examine how truth claims are related to practices and symbols that produce and regulate social life. As we will see, the production of the Third World through the articulation of knowledge and power is essential to the development discourse. This does not preclude the fact that from many Third World spaces, even the most reasonable among the West’s social and cultural practices might look quite peculiar, even strange. Nevertheless, even today most people in the West (and many parts of the Third World) have great difﬁculty thinking about Third World situations and people in terms other than those provided by the develop- ment discourse. These terms—such as overpopulation, the permanent threat of famine, poverty, illiteracy, and the like—operate as the most com- mon signiﬁers, already stereotyped and burdened with development signi- ﬁeds. Media images of the Third World are the clearest example of develop- mentalist representations. These images just do not seem to go away. This is why it is necessary to examine development in relation to the modern expe- riences of knowing, seeing, counting, economizing, and the like.¶ DECONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT¶ The discursive analysis of development started in the late 1980s and will most likely continue into the 1990s, coupled with attempts at articulating alternative regimes of representation and practice. Few works, however, have undertaken the deconstruction of the development discourse.7 James Ferguson’s recent book on development in Lesotho (1990) is a sophisticated example of the deconstructionist approach. Ferguson provides an in-depth analysis of rural development programs implemented in the country under World Bank sponsorship. Further entrenchment of the state, the restructur- ing of rural social relations, the deepening of Western modernizing inﬂu- ences, and the depoliticization of problems are among the most important effects of the deployment of rural development in Lesotho, despite the ap- parent failure of the programs in terms of their stated objectives. It is at the level of these effects, Ferguson concludes, that the productivity of the appa- ratus has to be assessed. Another deconstructionist approach (Sachs 1992) analyzes the central constructs or key words of the development discourse, such as market, plan- ning, population, environment, production, equality, participation, needs, poverty, and the like. After brieﬂy tracing the origin of each concept in Eu- ropean civilization, each chapter examines the uses and transformation of¶ 13INTRODUCTION¶ the concept in the development discourse from the 1950s to the present. The intent of the book is to expose the arbitrary character of the concepts, their cultural and historical speciﬁcity, and the dangers that their use repre- sents in the context of the Third World.8 A related, group project is con- ceived in terms of a “systems of knowledge” approach. Cultures, this group believes, are characterized not only by rules and values but also by ways of knowing. Development has relied exclusively on one knowledge system, namely, the modern Western one. The dominance of this knowledge system has dictated the marginalization and disqualiﬁcation of non-Western knowl- edge systems. In these latter knowledge systems, the authors conclude, re- searchers and activists might ﬁnd alternative rationalities to guide social action away from economistic and reductionistic ways of thinking.9 In the 1970s, women were discovered to have been “bypassed” by devel- opment interventions. This “discovery” resulted in the growth during the late 1970s and 1980s of a whole new ﬁeld, women in development (WID), which has been analyzed by several feminist researchers as a regime of rep- resentation, most notably Adele Mueller (1986, 1987a, 1991) and Chandra Mohanty. At the core of these works is an insightful analysis of the practices of dominant development institutions in creating and managing their client populations. Similar analyses of particular development subﬁelds—such as economics and the environment, for example—are a needed contribution to the understanding of the function of development as a discourse and will continue to appear.10 A group of Swedish anthropologists focus their work on how the concepts of development and modernity are used, interpreted, questioned, and re- produced in various social contexts in different parts of the world. An entire constellation of usages, modes of operation, and effects associated with these terms, which are profoundly local, is beginning to surface. Whether in a Papua New Guinean village or in a small town of Kenya or Ethiopia, local versions of development and modernity are formulated according to com- plex processes that include traditional cultural practices, histories of coloni- alism, and contemporary location within the global economy of goods and symbols (Dahl and Rabo 1992). These much-needed local ethnographies of development and modernity are also being pioneered by Pigg (1992) in her work on the introduction of health practices in Nepal. More on these works in the next chapter. Finally, it is important to mention a few works that focus on the role of conventional disciplines within the development discourse. Irene Gendzier (1985) examines the role political science played in the conformation of the- ories of modernization, particularly in the 1950s, and its relation to issues of the moment such as national security and economic imperatives. Also within political science, Kathryn Sikkink (1991) has more recently taken on the emergence of developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s and¶ 14 CHAPTER 1¶ 1960s. Her chief interest is the role of ideas in the adoption, implementa- tion, and consolidation of developmentalism as an economic development model.11 The Chilean Pedro Morandé (1984) analyzes how the adoption and dominance of North American sociology in the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America set the stage for a purely functional conception of development, conceived of as the transformation of “traditional” into a “modern” society and devoid of any cultural considerations. Kate Manzo (1991) makes a some- what similar case in her analysis of the shortcomings of modernist ap- proaches to development, such as dependency theory, and in her call for paying attention to “countermodernist” alternatives that are grounded in the practices of Third World grassroots actors. The call for a return of culture in the critical analysis of development, particularly local cultures, is also cen- tral to this book. As this short review shows, there are already a small but relatively coher- ent number of works that contribute to articulating a discursive critique of development. The present work makes the most general case in this regard; it seeks to provide a general view of the historical construction of develop- ment and the Third World as a whole and exempliﬁes the way the discourse functions in one particular case. The goal of the analysis is to contribute to the liberation of the discursive ﬁeld so that the task of imagining alternatives can be commenced (or perceived by researchers in a new light) in those spaces where the production of scholarly and expert knowledge for develop- ment purposes continues to take place. The local-level ethnographies of de- velopment mentioned earlier provide useful elements toward this end. In the conclusion, I extend the insights these works afford and attempt to elab- orate a view of “the alternative” as a research question and a social practice.¶ ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT ENCOUNTER¶ In the introduction to his well-known collection on anthropology’s relation to colonialism, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (1973), Talal Asad raised the question of whether there was not still “a strange reluctance on the part of most professional anthropologists to consider seriously the power structure within which their discipline has taken shape” (5), namely, the whole problematic of colonialism and neocolonialism, their political econ- omy and institutions. Does not development today, as colonialism did in a former epoch, make possible “the kind of human intimacy on which anthro- pological ﬁeldwork is based, but insure[s] that intimacy should be one-sided and provisional” (17), even if the contemporary subjects move and talk back? In addition, if during the colonial period “the general drift of anthropological understanding did not constitute a basic challenge to the unequal world represented by the colonial system” (18), is this not also the case with the¶ 15INTRODUCTION¶ development system? In sum, can we not speak with equ1al pertinence of “anthropology and the development encounter”? It is generally true that anthropology as a whole has not dealt explicitly with the fact that it takes place within the post–World War II encounter between rich and poor nations established by the development discourse. Although a number of anthropologists have opposed development interven- tions, particularly on behalf of indigenous people,12 large numbers of anthro- pologists have been involved with development organizations such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (U.S. AID). This problematic involvement was particularly noticeable in the decade 1975–1985 and has been analyzed elsewhere (Escobar 1991). As Stacy Leigh Pigg (1992) rightly points out, anthropologists have been for the most part either inside development, as applied anthropologists, or outside development, as the champions of the authentically indigenous and “the native’s point of view.” Thus they overlook the ways in which development operates as an arena of cultural contestation and identity construction. A small number of anthropologists, however, have studied forms and pro- cesses of resistance to development interventions (Taussig 1980; Fals Borda 1984; Scott 1985; Ong 1987; see also Comaroff 1985 and Comaroff and Co- maroff 1991 for resistance in the colonial context). The absence of anthropologists from discussions of development as a re- gime of representation is regrettable because, if it is true that many aspects of colonialism have been superseded, representations of the Third World through development are no less pervasive and effective than their colonial counterparts. Perhaps even more so. It is also disturbing, as Said has pointed out, that in recent anthropological literature “there is an almost **total absence of any reference to American imperial intervention as a factor affecting the theoretical discussion**” (1989, 214; see also Friedman 1987; Ulin 1991). **This imperial intervention takes place at many levels—economic**, military, politi- cal, and cultural—which are woven together by development representa- tions. Also disturbing, as Said proceeds to argue, is the lack of attention on the part of Western scholars to the sizable and impassioned critical literature by Third World intellectuals on colonialism, history, tradition, and domi- nation—and, one might add, development. The number of Third World voices calling for a dismantling of the entire discourse of development is fast increasing. The deep changes experienced in anthropology during the 1980s opened the way for examining how anthropology is bound up with “Western ways of creating the world,” as Strathern (1988, 4) advises, and potentially with other possible ways of representing the interests of Third World peoples. This critical examination of anthropology’s practices led to the realization that “no one can write about others any longer as if they were discrete ob-¶ 16 CHAPTER 1¶ jects or texts.” A new task thus insinuated itself: that of coming up with “more subtle, concrete ways of writing and reading . . . new conceptions of culture as interactive and historical” (Clifford 1986, 25). Innovation in an- thropological writing within this context was seen as “moving [ethnography] toward an unprecedentedly acute political and historical sensibility that is transforming the way cultural diversity is portrayed” (Marcus and Fischer 1986, 16). This reimagining of anthropology, launched in the mid-1980s, has be- come the object of various critiques, qualiﬁcations, and extensions from within its own ranks and by feminists, political economists, Third World scholars, Third World feminists, and anti-postmodernists. Some of these cri- tiques are more or less pointed and constructive than others, and it is not necessary to analyze them in this introduction.13 To this extent, “the experi- mental moment” of the 1980s has been very fruitful and relatively rich in applications. The process of reimagining anthropology, however, is clearly still under way and will have to be deepened, perhaps by taking the debates to other arenas and in other directions. Anthropology, it is now argued, has to “reenter” the real world, after the moment of textualist critique. To do this, it has to rehistoricize its own practice and acknowledge that this prac- tice is shaped by many forces that are well beyond the control of the eth- nographer. Moreover, it must be willing to subject its most cherished no- tions, such as ethnography, culture, and science, to a more radical scrutiny (Fox 1991). Strathern’s call that this questioning be advanced in the context of West- ern social science practices and their “endorsement of certain interests in the description of social life” is of fundamental importance. At the core of this recentering of the debates within the disciplines are the limits that exist to the Western project of deconstruction and self-critique. It is becoming increasingly evident, at least for those who are struggling for different ways of having a voice, that the process of deconstructing and dismantling has to be accompanied by that of constructing new ways of seeing and acting. Needless to say, this aspect is crucial in discussions about development, because people’s survival is at stake. As Mohanty (1991a) insists, both proj- ects—deconstruction and reconstruction—have to be carried out simulta- neously. As I discuss in the ﬁnal chapter, this simultaneous project could focus strategically on the collective action of social movements: they struggle not only for goods and services but also for the very deﬁnition of life, econ- omy, nature, and society. They are, in short, cultural struggles. As Bhabha wants us to acknowledge, deconstruction and other types of critiques do not lead automatically to “an unproblematic reading of other cultural and discursive systems.” They might be necessary to combat ethno- centrism, “but they cannot, of themselves, unreconstructed, represent that¶ 17INTRODUCTION¶ otherness” (Bhabha 1990, 75). Moreover, there is the tendency in these cri- tiques to discuss otherness principally in terms of the limits of Western logocentricity, thus **denying that cultural otherness is “implicated in speciﬁc historical and discursive conditions, requiring constructions** in different practices of reading” (Bhabha 1990, 73). There is a similar insistence in Latin America that the proposals of postmodernism, to be fruitful there, have to make clear their commitment to justice and to the construction of alterna- tive social orders.14 These Third World correctives indicate the need for alternative questions and strategies for the construction of anticolonialist discourses (and the reconstruction of Third World societies in/through rep- resentations that can develop into alternative practices). Calling into ques- tion the limitations of the West’s self-critique, as currently practiced in much of contemporary theory, they make it possible to visualize the “discur- sive insurrection” by Third World people proposed by Mudimbe in relation to the “sovereignty of the very European thought from which we wish to disentangle ourselves” (quoted in Diawara 1990, 79). The needed liberation of anthropology from the space mapped by the development encounter (and, more generally, modernity), to be achieved through a close examination of the ways in which it has been implicated in it, is an important step in the direction of more autonomous regimes of rep- resentation; this is so to the extent that it might motivate anthropologists and others to delve into the strategies people in the Third World pursue to resig- nify and transform their reality through their collective political practice. This challenge may provide paths toward the radicalization of the disci- pline’s reimagining started with enthusiasm during the 1980s.¶ OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK¶ The following chapter studies the emergence and consolidation of the dis- course and strategy of development in the early post–World War II period, as a result of the problematization of poverty that took place during those years. It presents the major historical conditions that made such a process possible and identiﬁes the principal mechanisms through which develop- ment has been deployed, namely, the professionalization of development knowledge and the institutionalization of development practices. An impor- tant aspect of this chapter is to illustrate the nature and dynamics of the discourse, its archaeology, and its modes of operation. Central to this aspect is the identiﬁcation of the basic set of elements and relations that hold to- gether the discourse. To speak development, one must adhere to certain rules of statement that go back to the basic system of categories and relations. This system deﬁnes the hegemonic worldview of development, a worldview that increasingly permeates and transforms the economic, social,¶ 18 CHAPTER 1¶ and cultural fabric of Third World cities and villages, even if the languages of development are always adapted and reworked signiﬁcantly at the local level. Chapter 3 is intended to articulate a cultural critique of economics by taking on the single most inﬂuential force shaping the development ﬁeld: the discourse of development economics. To understand this discourse, one has to analyze the conditions of its coming into being: how it emerged, build- ing upon the already existing Western economy and the economic doctrine generated by it (classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, and growth economic theories); how development **economists constructed “the underdeveloped economy,” embodying in their theories features of the advanced capitalist societies and culture**; the political economy of the capitalist world economy linked to this construction; and ﬁnally, the planning practices that inevitably came with development economics and that became a powerful force in the production and management of development. From this privileged space, economics pervaded the entire practice of development. As the last part of the chapter shows, there is no indication that economists might consider a redeﬁnition of their tenets and forms of analysis, although some hopeful insights for this redeﬁnition can be found in recent works in economic an- thropology. The notion of “communities of modellers” (Gudeman and Ri- vera 1990) is examined as a possible method to construct a cultural politics for engaging critically, and I hope neutralizing partly, the dominant eco- nomic discourse. Chapters 4 and 5 are intended to show in detail how development works. The goal of chapter 4 is to show how a corpus of rational techniques—plan- ning, methods of measurement and assessment, professional knowledges, institutional practices, and the like—organizes both forms of knowledge and types of power, relating one to the other, in the construction and treatment of one speciﬁc problem: malnutrition and hunger. The chapter examines the birth, rise, and decline of a set of disciplines (forms of knowledge) and strat- egies in nutrition, health, and rural development. Outlined initially in the early 1970s by a handful of experts in North American and British universi- ties, the World Bank, and the United Nations, the strategy of national plan- ning for nutrition and rural development resulted in the implementation of massive programs in Third World countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s, funded primarily by the World Bank and Third World governments. A case study of these plans in Colombia, based on my ﬁeldwork with a group of government planners in charge of their design and implementation, is presented as an illustration of the functioning of the development apparatus. By paying close attention to the political economy of food and hunger and the discursive constructions linked to it, this chapter and the next contribute to the development of a poststructuralist-oriented political economy.¶ 19INTRODUCTION¶ Chapter 5 extends the analysis of chapter 4 by focusing on the regimes of representation that underlie constructions of peasants, women, and the en- vironment. In particular, the chapter exposes the links between representa- tion and power at work in the practices of the World Bank. This institution is presented as an exemplar of development discourse, a blueprint of devel- opment. Particular attention is paid to representations of peasants, women, and the environment in recent development literature, and the contradic- tions and possibilities inherent in the tasks of integrated rural development, incorporating women into development, and sustainable development. The mapping of visibilities by development through the representations plan- ners and experts utilize as they design and carry out their programs is ana- lyzed in detail in order to show the connection between the creation of visibility in discourse, particularly through modern techniques of visuality, and the exercise of power. This chapter also contributes to theorizing the question of discursive change and transformation by explaining how dis- courses on peasants, women, and the environment emerge and function in similar ways within the overall space of development. The concluding chapter tackles the question of the transformation of the development regime of representation and the articulation of alternatives. The call by a growing number of Third and First World voices to signal the end of development is reviewed and assessed. Similarly, recent work in Latin American social science, on “hybrid cultures” as a mode of cultural afﬁrmation in the face of modernity’s crisis, is used as a basis for theorizing the formulation of alternatives as a research question and a social practice. I argue that instead of searching for grand alternative models or strategies, what is needed is the investigation of alternative representations and prac- tices in concrete local settings, particularly as they exist in contexts of hy- bridization, collective action, and political mobilization. This proposal is de- veloped in the context of the ecological phase of capital and the struggles over the world’s biological diversity. These struggles—between global capi- tal and biotechnology interests, on the one hand, and local communities and organizations, on the other—constitute the most advanced stage in which the meanings of development and postdevelopment are being fought over. The fact that the struggles usually involve minority cultures in the tropical regions of the world raises unprecedented questions concerning the cultural politics around the design of social orders, technology, nature, and life itself. The fact that the analysis, ﬁnally, is conducted in terms of tales is not meant to indicate that the said tales are mere ﬁctions. As Donna Haraway says in her analysis of the narratives of biology (1989a, 1991), narratives are neither ﬁctions nor opposed to “facts.” Narratives are, indeed, historical tex- tures woven of fact and ﬁction. Even the most neutral scientiﬁc domains are narratives in this sense. To treat science as narrative, Haraway insists, is not¶ 20 CHAPTER 1¶ to be dismissive. On the contrary, it is to treat it in the most serious way, without succumbing to its mystiﬁcation as “the truth” or to the ironic skepti- cism common to many critiques. Science and expert discourses such as de- velopment produce powerful truths, ways of creating and intervening in the world, including ourselves; they are instances “where possible worlds are constantly reinvented in the contest for very real, present worlds” (Haraway 1989a, 5). Narratives, such as the tales in this book, are always inmmersed in history and never innocent. Whether we can unmake development and per- haps even bid farewell to the Third World will equally depend on the social invention of new narratives, new ways of thinking and doing.15

#### This process fuels damaging use of capital for the sake of power – impact is value to life

**Harvey in 3** (David, PHD, The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, http://web. me.com/eatonak/PE/page10/files/New%20Imperialism.pdf)

It is, of course, the populations of those vulnerable territories who then must pay the inevitable price, in terms of loss of assets, loss of jobs, and loss of economic security, to say nothing of the loss of dignity and hope. And by the same logic that has it that the most vulnerable territories get hit first, so it is typically the most vulnerable populations within those territories that bear the brunt of any burden. It was the rural poor of Mexico, Thailand, and Brazil who suffered most from the depredations that flowed from the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The very idea that those who irresponsibly lend might also be held responsible is, of course, dismissed out of hand by ruling elites. That would require calling the wealthy property-owning classes everywhere to account and insisting that they look to their responsibilities rather than to their inalienable rights to private property and a satisfactory rate of profit. But, as Joseph Chamberlain found, it is far easier politically to pillage and debase far-away populations (particularly those who are racially, ethnically, or culturally different), than to confront overwhelming capitalist class power at home. The sinister and destructive side of spatial-temporal fixes to the overaccumulation problem becomes just as crucial an element within the historical geography of capitalism as does its creative counterpart in building a new landscape to accommodate both the endless accumulation of capital and the endless accumulation of political power.

#### Vote negative to endorse the introduction of indigenous knowledge and conservation practices into the deforestation debate – the K turns the case – only by endorsing specific solutions in the context of the country can we solve deforestation

FPP 11 (Forest Peoples Program, November 2011, ￼”The Reality of REDD+ in Peru: Between Theory and Practice, HSA)

In the light of the problems associated with deforestation and destruction of tropical forests, indigenous peoples in Peru are not simply debating these issues, but have already responded with their own solutions. Throughout Peru, indigenous peoples have organised themselves into community based organisations. Many of these organisations are working actively to police their boundaries, monitor and report environmental destruction and contamination and to promote low intensity community forest management practices that generate revenue but are compatible with forest conservation.¶ Given the huge implications of national REDD+ policies and sub national REDD+ projects, indigenous peoples’ organisations in Peru led by AIDESEP are not only highlighting their concerns but are also putting forward constructive and alternative proposals. They have identified a set of principles that are necessary if REDD+ is to respect indigenous peoples’ rights and ways of life, empower indigenous peoples who have traditionally protected the forest rather than rewarding polluters and act as an effective tool for climate change mitigation. Key human rights principles include the requirement for reform to recognise land and territorial rights and align national legislation with international obligations on indigenous peoples’ fundamental rights prior to REDD+ implementation. To assure ecological integrity they demand that REDD+ must not be financed by carbon offset mechanisms or include a narrow focus on carbon which could result in the inclusion of plantations. The result is an approach described as ‘Indigenous REDD+’ that includes a set of criteria for the development of national REDD+ strategies and for project level activities. These alternatives to REDD+ have evolved within a context specific to Peru, but many of its key principles could be much more broadly applicable.

### 1NC Disease

#### Empirically no zoonose extinction—burn out

Medical News, 4-14

(“Zoonosis History”, 4-14-14, <http://www.news-medical.net/health/Zoonosis-History.aspx>, amp)

Zoonosis History Most of human prehistory was spent as small bands of hunter-gatherers; these bands were rarely larger than 150 individuals, and were not in contact with other bands very often. Because of this, epidemic or pandemic diseases, which depend on a constant influx of humans who have not developed an immune response, tended to burn out after their first run through a population. To survive, a biological pathogen had to be a chronic infection, stay alive in the host for long periods, or have a non-human reservoir in which to live while waiting for new hosts to pass by. In fact, for many 'human' diseases, the human is actually an accidental victim and a dead-end host. (This is the case with rabies, anthrax, tularemia, West Nile virus, and many others). Thus, much of human development has been in relation to zoonotic, not epidemic, diseases. Many modern diseases, even epidemic diseases, started out as zoonotic diseases. It is hard to be certain which diseases jumped from other animals to humans, but there is good evidence that measles, smallpox, influenza, HIV, and diphtheria came to us this way. The common cold, and tuberculosis may also have started in other species. In modern days, zoonoses are of practical interest because they are often previously unrecognized diseases or have increased virulence in populations lacking immunity. The West Nile virus appeared in the United States in 1999 in the New York City area, and moved through the country in the summer of 2002, causing much distress. Bubonic plague is a zoonotic disease, as are salmonella, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and Lyme disease.

#### Tons of zoonoses already—most have existed for a long time—no extinction and inevitable—insert this chart into the debate—READ YELLOW HIGHLIGHTING

Public Health England, 13

(4-1-13, <http://www.hpa.org.uk/Topics/InfectiousDiseases/InfectionsAZ/Zoonoses/TableZoonoticDiseases/>, amp)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Disease** | **Organism** | **Main reservoirs** | **Usual mode of transmission to humans** |
| [Anthrax](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942145749) | [*Bacillus anthracis*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942145749) | livestock, wild animals, environment | direct contact, ingestion |
| [Animal influenza](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1287144383636) | [influenza viruses](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1287144383636) | livestock, humans | may be reverse zoonosis |
| [Avian influenza](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1160495617087) | [Influenza virus, avian strains](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1160495617087) | poultry, ducks | direct contact |
| [Bovine tuberculosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1296683154769) | [*Mycobacterium bovis*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1296683154769) | cattle | milk |
| [Brucellosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172786) | [*Brucella species*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172786) | cattle, goats, sheep, pigs | dairy products, milk |
| [Cat scratch fever](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/Page/1191942176115) | [*Bartonella henselae*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1195733767284) | cats | bite, scratch |
| Cysticercosis | *Taenia* species | cattle, pigs | meat |
| [Cryptosporidiosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942152906) | [*Cryptosporidium species*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942152906) | cattle, sheep, pets | water, direct contact |
| [Enzootic abortion](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191941274772) | [*Chlamydophila abortus*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191941274772) | farm animals, sheep | direct contact, aerosol |
| [Erysipeloid](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942169801) | [*Erysipelothrix rhusiopathiae*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942169801) | pigs, fish, environment | direct contact |
| Fish tank granuloma | *Mycobacterium marinum* | fish | direct contact, water |
| [Food poisoning](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942150117) | [*Campylobacter species*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942152843) | poultry, farm animals | raw meat, milk |
| [*Salmonella species*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942171563) | poultry, cattle, sheep, pigs | foodborne |
| [Giardiasis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942170329) | [Giardia lamblia](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942170329) | humans, wildlife | waterborne, person to person |
| [Glanders](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942170343) | [*Burkholderia mallei*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942170343) | horse, donkey, mule | direct contact |
| [Haemorrhagic colitis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1203928714829) | [*Escherichia coli O157*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1203928714829) | ruminants | direct contact (and foodborne) |
| [Hantavirus syndromes](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172978) | [Hantaviruses](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172978) | rodents | aerosol |
| [Hepatitis E](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942127585) | [Hepatitis E virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942127585) | not yet known | not yet known |
| [Hydatid disease](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942169837) | [*Echinococcus granulosus*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942169837) | dogs, sheep | ingestion of eggs excreted by dog |
| [Leptospirosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942176636) | [*Leptospira species*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942176636) | rodents, ruminants | infected urine, water |
| [Listeriosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172752) | [*Listeria monocytogenes*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172752) | cattle, sheep, soil | dairy produce, meat products |
| [Louping ill](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172074) | [Louping ill virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172074) | sheep, grouse | direct contact, tick bite |
| [Lyme disease](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942149546) | [*Borrelia burgdorferi*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942149546) | ticks, rodents, sheep, deer, small mammals | tick bite |
| [Lymphocytic choriomeningitis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1317138167416) | [Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1317138167416) | rodents | direct contact |
| [Orf](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942171030) | [Orf virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942171030) | sheep | direct contact |
| [Pasteurellosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1203084388309) | [*Pasteurella multocida*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1203084388309) | dogs, cats, many mammals | bite/scratch, direct contact |
| [Plague](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148961) | [*Yersinia pestis*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148961) | rats and their fleas | flea bite |
| [Psittacosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942149578) | [*Chlamydophila psittaci*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942149578) | birds, poultry, ducks | aerosol, direct contact |
| [Q fever](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172161) | [*Coxiella burnetii*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942172161) | cattle, sheep, goats, cats | aerosol, direct contact, milk, fomites |
| [Rabies](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942176094) | [Rabies viruses](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942176094) | dogs, foxes, bats, cats | animal bite |
| [Rat bite fever (Haverhill fever)](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942169833) | [*Streptobacillus moniliformis*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942169833) | rats | bite/scratch, milk, water |
| [Rift Valley fever](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1274087829165) | [Rift Valley fever virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1274087829165) | cattle, goats, sheep | direct contact, mosquito bite |
| [Ringworm](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942126398) | [Dermatophyte fungi](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942126398) | cats, dogs, cattle, many animal species | direct contact |
| [Streptococcal sepsis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1204100463317) | [*Streptococcus suis*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1204100463317) | pigs | direct contact, meat |
| [Streptococcal sepsis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1205914031232) | [*Streptococcus zooepidemicus*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1205914031232) | horses, cattle | direct contact, milk |
| [Tickborne encephalitis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1254510323979) | [Tickborne encephalitis virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1254510323979) | rodents, small mammals, livestock | tickbite, unpasteurised milk products |
| [Toxocariasis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148976) | [*Toxocara canis/cati*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148976) | dogs, cats | direct contact |
| [Toxoplasmosis](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148953) | [*Toxoplasma gondii*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148953) | cats, ruminants | ingestion of faecal oocysts, meat |
| Trichinellosis | *Trichinella spiralis* | pigs, wild boar | pork products |
| [Tularemia](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148966) | [*Francisella tularensis*](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148966) | rabbits, wild animals, environment, ticks | direct contact, aerosol, ticks, inoculation |
| [Viral haemorrhagic fevers](http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148922) | [Ebola, Crimean-Congo HF, Lassa and Marburg viruses](http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148922) | variously: rodents, ticks, livestock, primates, bats | direct contact, inoculation, ticks |
| [West Nile fever](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148894) | [West nile virus](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942148894) | wild birds, mosquitoes | mosquito bite |
| [Zoonotic diphtheria](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942152928) | *[Corynebacterium ulcerans](http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListName/Page/1191942152928)* | cattle, farm animals, dogs | direct contact, milk |

**Nuke war destroys medical infrastructure causing massive disease outbreaks**

**Nissani 92** [Moti Nissani, Ph.D., Genetics, University of Pittsburgh, B.A., philosophy, psychology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “Chapter 2: CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR,” Lives in the Balance: the Cold War and American Politics, 1945-1991, 1992, <http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/PAGEPUB/CH2.html>]

These remarkable differences between us and our ancestors, and between us and many of our less fortunate contemporaries in poor nations, are not for the most part attributable to better cures. They spring from advances in our understanding of the causes of diseases and, consequently, in our ability to combat them effectively by preventing their occurrence. Prevention strategies include such things as sanitation, widespread immunization, nutritional supplements, chlorination of drinking water, and drying or spraying swamps as part of the fight against malaria. In contrast, in past centuries people were more susceptible to disease because of poor nutrition, poor education, and inadequate shelter. No complex infrastructure for controlling epidemics existed. Owing to poor sanitation, typhoid, cholera, plague, and many other epidemics spread unabated. In the absence of antibiotics, deaths from diseases like pneumonia and syphilis were commonplace.  It follows that modern advances in health are ascribable to new knowledge and to the development of a complex infrastructure of prevention and health-care delivery. After a nuclear war the knowledge may remain. But much of the infrastructure will be destroyed, **precisely at the point when it is most sorely needed** by the irradiated, starved, and emotionally and physically stressed survivors. At least for a few years, survivors of warring nations might revert to the good old days of their forebears, or to the good contemporary days of their less fortunate brothers and sisters in the Third World. **Epidemics of all sorts might break out**. Many people who depend for survival on medical help (like diabetics and regular users of dialysis machines) will be dead in a short time.

**No extinction**

**Posner, law prof, 5**—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html, AG)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.

**Intervening actors check**

**Zakaria, PhD from Harvard, 9—**Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935, AMiles)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristics that led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.

### 1NC Warming

**Squo solves**

**A) Carbon sucking**

Stephen 12 7/21/12 (David, “Global warming: In geoengineering we may trust”, <http://www.groundreport.com/Media_and_Tech/Global-warming-In-geoengineering-we-may-trust_1/2947148>, CMR)

At least, there is reason to believe in a short-term source for respite, geoengineering, if a feared level of climate change is about. Geoengineering is now likely for large scale-deployment more than ever, as weather anomalies globally have become a serious cause for concern and news of rising levels of carbon emissions continue to come.¶ ¶ Geoengineering is the scientific answer to the tepidity of world leaders, towards a global agreement to mitigate global warming-causing greenhouse emissions. Geoengineering (or climate engineering) is a general name for certain technologies aimed at reducing solar radiation available to the earth, or at removing carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) from the atmosphere.¶ ¶ Geoengineering technologies range from simple to complex, with a technology as ‘simple’ as afforestation, and another as complex as putting giant reflectors in space to return inbound solar radiation. Geoengineering technologies have their controversies, as their effects can be tied to international conflicts; or threats to biodiversity & urbanization; or further weather catastrophe, and unknowns. ¶ ¶ Geoengineering is also expensive and will have to be sustained for a number of years after initial deployment. All these worries are there, but are placed a little less than the good it will do as an alternative. Geoengineering had a big week, with two major announcements. The bigger one, a carbon dioxide removal test, reported findings from a research on iron fertilization, conducted in 2004, that showed the ability of phytoplankton to sequester carbon at sea depths.¶ ¶ The other announcement, a solar management one, is an intention to test the effects of injecting sulphate particles to about 24km above sea level, to know their effects on ozone chemistry. These steps-forward in geoengineering, point to form. Geoengineering is gradually taking shape, and as time goes, most of the several questions asked in the 2009 UK’s Royal Society Report on geoengineering, will find a home.¶ ¶ Geoengineering research is advocated, and the plea is for more public funds to come in. The US government via the National Science Foundation is involved, and the British government recently supported a proposed research on geoengineering. Geoengineering research in Canada, Europe and Australia is getting some support from the government, and the subject in these places is rising.

**B) Chemtrails**

**Castle 03**

(Dr. R. Michael Castle, Michael Castle is an Environmental Professional whom holds a National Certification for Environmental Risk Assessment with 19 years of field practice in Environmental Risk Assessment, Investigation, Analyses and Remediation. A Polymer Chemist for 22 years prior to establishment of the Environmental Consulting and Engineering Firm, Castle Concepts Consultants, Inc.a Polymer Chemist and an Environmental Professional whom holds a National Certification for Environmental Risk Assessment, “The Methodic Demise of Natural Earth, An Environmental Impact Overview”, 9/28/03, <http://www.bariumblues.com/methodic_demise_of_natural_earth.htm>, nkj)

These Global-Warming Mitigation Strategies, UV Mitigation and the cessation of the effects of Atmospheric Greenhouse-gases were given a commonality by Teller, et al, and this was the use of a sub-micron particulate. Barium, Aluminum, Thorium, Selenium were to be processed into a sub-micron particle dispensed from high-altitude aircraft, ionized with a specific electrical charge. ( BARIUM MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET ) (4) (Chemtrails and Barium – absorption & inhalation .. see links below (5) We must surmise that ionization keeps the specific heavy metal particulate aloft for longer periods of time. This electronically charged particulate matrix might also be the perfect RF control field. Theoretically, the heavy metals would block and reflect the sunlight from entering the Earth’s atmosphere and reflect 1-2% back into space. UV radiation levels would decline. Teller also recommended the use of Commercial Aircraft as-well-as-Military Aircraft to carry out the enormous and epic task of coverage to the Earth’s Stratosphere. We believe that the weaponization use of these technologies has been well demonstrated for a US DOD program entitled “RF Dominance”. The US Air Force VTRP and the Navy’s RFMP are other military programs utilizing aerosolized heavy metal particulates, including aluminized fiberglass or chaffe are characteristic of current military operations.

( RADIO FREQUENCY MISSION PLANNER ) (6)

CIA-led Project Cloverleaf was one of the initial “aerosolized heavy-metal particulate” operations. Massive spraying of the upper-atmosphere/Stratosphere commenced. The U.S. DOD operations soon followed, as the US Air Force became embedded in the overall operations, strategically. The U.S. Air Force would also play significantly into the expansion of a significant Global-Warming Mitigation strategies in the form of Weather Modification and Geo-Engineering practices.

Federally Approved Contractors became involved in this massive, Global effort to save Earth from certain doom. Federal Approved Contractors, FAC’s, were part of the research, Development and deployment aspects of these projects, and many of them have visited the premiere website Carnicom – Aerosol Operations (8). (See – Visitors) FAC Academia, multi-National Corporations, U.S. Military/Industrial Complex/Corporations, became eager partners in this effort. One in particular, Hughes Aircraft Corporation of California turned research efforts towards this endeavor.

Thorium and oxides, Aluminum and Silicon carbide have been identified in a special mixture referred to generally as Welsbach Refractory Seeding Agents US Patent 5, 003,186. - March 26, 1991. ( Stratospheric Welsbach seeding for the reduction of Global Warming ) (9) This patent was assigned and awarded in 1990 to Hughes Aircraft Corporation.

#### Deforestation not a cause of warming – their data is cherrypicked. Prefer ev citing Woods Hole, the world’s best climatology center

REDD-Monitor 14 (REDD-Monitor, February 15, 2014, “REDD myth no.1: Deforestation accounts for 25% of greenhouse gas emissions,” <http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/02/15/redd-myth-no-1-deforestation-accounts-for-25-of-greenhouse-gas-emissions/>, alp)

Myth: “Deforestation accounts for 25 percent of all man-made emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide.” That statement comes from a 2005 press release from the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. A year later, FAO had decided that the figure was too low: in fact between 25 and 30 percent of the greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere each year … is caused by deforestation. In its 2007 report, the IPCC estimated that deforestation accounted for 17% of emissions. Two years later, in a paper published in Nature Geoscience, Guido van der Werf and colleagues, argued that the figure was actually closer to 12%. While estimates of the rate of deforestation globally are fairly steady, emissions from burning fossil fuels are increasing rapidly. As such, the percentage of emissions from deforestation is falling. A graph in the paper illustrates this clearly: At the end of 2012, research teams from Winrock International and Woods Hole Research Center produced a joint study. Their conclusion was that, “Tropical deforestation accounts for about 10 percent of the world’s heat-trapping emissions.” The figures for deforestation used to produce this figure were between 2000 and 2005. Since then emissions from fossil fuels have increased and deforestation accounts for a lower percentage of global emissions today. Of course this does not mean that the problem of deforestation is solved. Far from it. But deforestation accounts for 10% of greenhouse gas emissions – a number that is falling. On its website, UN-REDD still uses the 20% figure: Deforestation and forest degradation, through agricultural expansion, conversion to pastureland, infrastructure development, destructive logging, fires etc., account for nearly 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions, more than the entire global transportation sector and second only to the energy sector. I’ve written to the UN-REDD Programme Secretariat and asked why they continue to use a figure that is almost double the most recent research. I’ll post their response in the comments.

**Rising CO2 spurs plant growth ---- prevents famine ensuring global peace**

**Idso ‘99** (Dr. Sherwood, President, former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona and Dr. Keith, Ph.D. in Botany at Arizona State University, President and Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, CO2 Science, “Give Peace a Chance by Giving Plants a Chance”, Vol. 2, No. 19, 10-1, <http://www.co2science.org/scripts/CO2ScienceB2C/articles/V2/N19/EDIT.jsp>, CMR)

President Carter begins by stating that "when the Cold War ended 10 years ago, we expected an era of peace" but got instead "a decade of war." He then asks why peace has been so elusive, answering that most of today's wars are fueled by poverty, poverty in developing countries "whose economies depend on agriculture but which lack the means to make their farmland productive." This fact, he says, suggests an obvious, but often overlooked, path to peace: "raise the standard of living of the millions of rural people who live in poverty by increasing agricultural productivity," his argument being that thriving agriculture, in his words, "is the engine that fuels broader economic growth and development, thus paving the way for prosperity and peace." Can the case for atmospheric CO2 enrichment be made any clearer? Automatically, and without the investment of a single hard-earned dollar, ruble, or what have you, people everywhere promote the cause of peace by fertilizing the atmosphere with carbon dioxide; for CO2 - one of the major end-products of the combustion process that fuels the engines of industry and transportation - is the very elixir of life, being the primary building block of all plant tissues via the essential role it plays in the photosynthetic process that sustains nearly all of earth's vegetation, which in turn sustains nearly all of the planet's animal life. As with any production process, the insertion of more raw materials (in this case CO2) into the production line results in more manufactured goods coming out the other end, which, in the case of the production line of plant growth and development, is biosphere-sustaining food. And as President Carter rightly states, "leaders of developing nations must make food security a priority." Indeed, he ominously proclaims in his concluding paragraph that "there can be no peace until people have enough to eat." Within this context, we recently completed a project commissioned by the Greening Earth Society entitled "Forecasting World Food Supplies: The Impact of the Rising Atmospheric CO2 Concentration," which we presented at the Second Annual Dixy Lee Ray Memorial Symposium held in Washington, DC on 31 August - 2 September 1999. We found that continued increases in agricultural knowledge and expertise would likely boost world food production by 37% between now and the middle of the next century, but that world food needs, which we equated with world population, would likely rise by 51% over this period. Fortunately, we also calculated that the shortfall in production could be overcome - but just barely - by the additional benefits anticipated to accrue from the many productivity-enhancing effects of the expected rise in the air's CO2 content over the same time period. Our findings suggest that the world food security envisioned by President Carter is precariously dependent upon the continued rising of the atmosphere's CO2 concentration. As Sylvan Wittwer, Director Emeritus of Michigan State University's Agricultural Experiment Station, stated in his 1995 book, Food, Climate, and Carbon Dioxide: The Global Environment and World Food Production, "The rising level of atmospheric CO2 could be the one global natural resource that is progressively increasing food production and total biological output, in a world of otherwise diminishing natural resources of land, water, energy, minerals, and fertilizer. It is a means of inadvertently increasing the productivity of farming systems and other photosynthetically active ecosystems. The effects know no boundaries and both developing and developed countries are, and will be, sharing equally." So, let's give peace a chance. Let's give plants a chance. And, while we're at it, let's give all of the world's national economies a chance as well. Let's let the air's CO2 content rise unimpeded, and let's let the peoples of the world reap the multitudinous benefits that come from the God-given - and scientifically proven - aerial fertilization effect of atmospheric CO2 enrichment. Let's live and let live. And let's let CO2 do its wonderful work of promoting world peace via the planet-wide prosperity that comes from enhanced agricultural productivity.

**Extinction – outweighs warming**

**Cribb ’10** (Julian Cribb, principal of JCA, fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2010, The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and What We Can Do to Avoid It, <http://books.google.com/books?id=Tv0zXxbQ7toC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+coming+famine&hl=en&sa=X&ei=RR_mT7OYFKeq2gXP5tHZCQ&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=the%20coming%20famine&f=false>, CMR)

The character of **human conflict has** also **changed**: since the early 1990S, **more wars have been triggered by disputes over food**, land, and water **than** over **mere** political or ethnic **differences**. This should not surprise US: **people have fought over** the **means of survival** for most of history. But in the abbreviated reports on the nightly media, and even in the rarefied realms of government policy, the focus is almost invariably on the players—the warring national, ethnic, or religious factions—rather than on the play, the deeper subplots building the tensions that ignite conflict. **Caught up** in these **are** groups of ordinary, **desperate people fearful** that **there is no longer sufficient food**, land, and water to feed their children—**and believing** that **they must fight** ‘the others” **to secure them**. At the same time, the number of refugees in the world doubled, many of them escaping from conflicts and famines precipitated by food and resource shortages. Governments in troubled regions tottered and fell. **The coming famine is planetary** **because it involves** both **the immediate effects of hunger on** directly affected populations in **heavily populated regions of the world** in the next forty years—**and** also **the impacts of war**, government failure, refugee crises, shortages, and food price spikes **that will affect all human beings,** no matter who they are or where they live. It is an emergency because unless it is solved, **billions will experience great hardship**, and not only in the poorer regions. Mike Murphy, one of the world’s most progressive dairy farmers, with operations in Ireland, New Zealand, and North and South America, succinctly summed it all up: “Global **warming gets** all the **publicity** **but the real imminent threat to the human race is starvation on a massive scale**. Taking a 10—30 year view, I believe that **food shortages, famine and huge social unrest are** probably **the greatest threat the human race has ever faced**. I believe **future food shortages are a far bigger world threat than global warming**.”2° The coming famine is also complex, because it is driven not by one or two, or even a half dozen, factors but rather by the confluence of many large and profoundly intractable causes that tend to amplify one another. This means that it cannot easily be remedied by “silver bullets” in the form of technology, subsidies, or single-country policy changes, because of the synergetic character of the things that power it.

**Alt Cause—Cows and ruminants\*\***

LA Times ‘7 (“Pollution on the hoof”, Oct 15, <http://articles.latimes.com/print/2007/oct/15/opinion/ed-methane15>, CMR)

It's a silent but deadly source of greenhouse gases that contributes more to global warming than the entire world transportation sector, yet politicians almost never discuss it, and environmental lobbyists and other green activist groups seem unaware of its existence. That may be because it's tough to take cow flatulence seriously. But livestock emissions are no joke. Most of the national debate about global warming centers on carbon dioxide, the world's most abundant greenhouse gas, and its major sources -- fossil fuels. Seldom mentioned is that cows and other ruminants, such as sheep and goats, are walking gas factories that take in fodder and put out methane and nitrous oxide, two greenhouse gases that are far more efficient at trapping heat than carbon dioxide. Methane, with 21 times the warming potential of CO2, comes from both ends of a cow, but mostly the front. Frat boys have nothing on bovines, as it's estimated that a single cow can belch out anywhere from 25 to 130 gallons of methane a day. It isn't just the gas they pass that makes livestock troublesome. A report from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization identified livestock as one of the two or three top contributors to the world's most serious environmental problems, including water pollution and species loss. In terms of climate change, livestock are a threat not only because of the gases coming from their stomachs and manure but because of deforestation, as land is cleared to make way for pastures, and the amount of energy needed to produce the crops that feed the animals. All told, livestock are responsible for 18% of greenhouse-gas emissions worldwide, according to the U.N. -- more than all the planes, trains and automobiles on the planet. And it's going to get a lot worse. As living standards rise in the developing world, so does its fondness for meat and dairy. Annual per-capita meat consumption in developing countries doubled from 31 pounds in 1980 to 62 pounds in 2002, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, which expects global meat production to more than double by 2050. That means the environmental damage of ranching would have to be cut in half just to keep emissions at their current, dangerous level. It isn't enough to improve mileage standards or crack down on diesel truck emissions, as politicians at both the state and national levels are working to do. Eventually, the United States and other countries are going to have to clean up their agricultural practices, while consumers can do their part by cutting back on red meat.

**No impact—Adaptation solves**

Goklany ‘11 (Dr. Indur, independent scholar who has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector over 35 years, former representative to the IPCC, former Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, a visiting fellow the American Enterprise Institute, part of a chapter from “Climate Coup: Global Warmings Invasion of Our Government and Our Lives”, page # below, CMR)

It is often argued that unless greenhouse gases are reduced forth with, the resulting global warming could have severe, if not catastrophic, consequences for developing countries because they lack the economic and human resources to cope with warming's consequences. But this argument has two major problems. First, although developing countries' adaptive capacity is low today, it does not follow that their ability to cope will be low forever. In fact, under the IPCC's warmest scenario, which would increase globally averaged temperature by 4 degrees Celsius relative lo 1990, net GDP per capita in developing countries (after accounting for losses due to climate change per the Stem Revieio's exaggerated estimates) will be double the United States' 2006 level in 2100, and triple that in 2200. Thus, developing countries should be able to cope with climate change substantially better in the future than the United States can today. But these advances in adaptive capacity, which are virtually ignored by most assessments of the impacts and damages from global warming, are the inevitable consequence of the assumptions built into the IPCC's emission scenarios. Hence, the notion that developing countries will be unable to cope with global warming does not square with the basic assumptions that underpin the magnitude of emissions, global warming, and its projected impacts under the IPCC scenarios. Second, global warming would not create new problems; rather it would exacerbate some existing problems of poverty (e.g., hunger, malaria, extreme events), while relieving others (e.g., habitat loss and water shortages in some places). One approach to dealing with the consequences of global warming is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. That action would, however, reduce all global warming impacts, whether they are good (e.g., net reduction in the global population at risk of water shortage or in the habitat used for cultivation) or bad (e.g., arguably increased levels of malaria or hunger). And even where global warming provides no benefits, reducing emissions would at best only reduce global warming's contribution to the problem, but not the whole problem, since non-warming factors are also contributors.'111 With respect to mortality from hunger, malaria, and extreme events, for example, global warming only contributes 13 percent of the problem in 2085 (which is beyond the foreseeable future). Another approach to reducing the global warming impacts would be to reduce the climate-sensitive problems of poverty through "focused adaptation."10\* Focused adaptation would allow society to capture the benefits of global warming while allowing it to reduce the totality of climate-sensitive problems that warming might worsen. For mortality from hunger, malaria, and extreme events, for instance, focused adaptation could through the foreseeable future address 100 percent of the problem, whereas emission reductions would at most deal with only 13 percent. [182-184]

### 1NC new

**tunnel vision—there is no scenario for complete collapse**

**Ridder 2008** – PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation”) \*ES = environmental services

The low resilience assumption

Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This ‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity.

An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1982, pp. 95–96). This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).

The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence.

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation:

Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)

Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence. The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors.

The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity

**Forests resilient**

**Laurance 99 –** senior research scientist, National Institute for Research in the Amazon(William, March, Are rainforests inhaling Earth's excess carbon dioxide?, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1134/is\_2\_108/ai\_54032999/print, AG)

Now it seems that the mystery of the "missing" carbon dioxide may be solved--at least partly. Working at fifty sites scattered throughout the Amazon and Central America, our research team, which includes British ecologists Oliver Phillips, of the University of Leeds, and Yadvinder Malhi, of the University of Edinburgh, and others, has compiled studies of more than a hundred thousand trees over the past thirty years. To our surprise, we found that the total mass of living trees in each acre of rainforest at our sites has increased by an average of 17 metric tons (37,000 pounds) since the beginning of our study. Not only are these forests producing more trees per acre, but the existing trees are growing larger faster. To produce that much extra plant tissue over the course of thirty years, each acre would have had to utilize an additional twenty tons of carbon dioxide. In the Amazon basin alone, intact rainforests could be absorbing over one billion tons of carbon dioxide each year. Our conclusions are in line with earlier studies of two small areas of intact forest in the Amazon that also use dramatically increased quantities of carbon dioxide. Why are the forests suddenly producing more and bigger trees per acre? One possibility is that extra plant nutrients, such as nitrogen and phosphorus, have been raining down on the forests as other areas burn. But more likely is the startling conclusion that the accelerated growth is a direct response to high levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. To grow, plants need sugars, which they synthesize from carbon dioxide. A greater quantity of available [CO.sub.2] may thus mean more and faster growth.

**No water wars or water cycle impact**

Katz 11—Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University. PhD (David, Hydro-Political Hyperbole, Global Environmental Politics, 11; 1; Feb 2011)

A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were [End Page 15] more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conflict.30